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Abstract Consider Fisher’s and Arrow-Debreu’s market equilibrium models for a linear utilities case
consisting of a set B of buyers and a set G of divisible goods. Supposing that a vector of prices P =
(p1, . . . , p|G|) for goods is given and there are some buyers with surplus money, but, by the politics of the
market, prices P are constant and cannot be changed in order to compute an equilibrium. In this paper, a set
of buyerswith surplusmoney is called a violated set. First, we define a kind of violated set calledmaximum
mean, then compute a set of buyers with maximum surplus money corresponding to the definition of a
maximum mean violated set. We show a maximum mean set is found in O(mn log(n2/m)) time, where
n = |B| + |G|, andm is the number of pairs (i, j), such that buyer i has some utility for purchasing goods j.
© 2012 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
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Amarket consisting of a setB of buyers and a setG of divisible
goods is given. We are given for each buyer i the amount ei of
money she possesses, and for each good, j, the amount bj of
goods. Let uij denote the utility derived by i on obtaining a unit
amount of goods j. Let P = (p1, . . . , p|G|) denote a vector of
prices. If, at these prices buyer, i is given goods j, she derives,
uij/pi amount of utility per unit amount of money spent. Define
αi = maxj uij/pj. Clearly, buyer i will be happiest with goods
that maximize uij/pj. This motivates defining a bipartite graph
D = (G, B), which, for each i ∈ B and j ∈ G, (i, j) is an edge in D
iff αi = uij/pj.
Computing the largest amount of goods that can be sold,
without exceeding the budgets of buyers or the amount of
goods available (assumed unit for each item of goods), can be
accomplished by computing max-flow in the following net-
work: Direct the edge of D from G to B and assign a capacity of
infinity to all these edges. Introduce source vertex s, sink vertex
t , a directed edge from s to each vertex j ∈ Gwith a capacity of
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doi:10.1016/j.scient.2012.10.039pj, and adirected edge fromeach vertex i ∈ B to twith a capacity
of ei. This network is clearly a function of the current prices, P ,
and defined by N(P). An equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. the prices
P iff (s,G ∪ B ∪ t) and (s ∪ G ∪ B, t) are two min-cuts in N(P).
Fisher’s and Arrow–Debreu’s market equilibrium models are
the two fundamental models within mathematical economics.
In both models, the purpose is to compute an equilibrium.
In Fisher’ model [1], all initial endowments are in dollars:
each buyer, i, has a fixed amount of money, ei, and it does
not change by increasing or decreasing the prices. Devanur
et al. [2] gave the first polynomial time algorithm for computing
an equilibrium, using O(n4(log n + n logUmax + logM)) max-
flow computations, whereM depends on the endowments and
Umax is the maximum utility. Recently, Orlin [3] developed the
first strongly polynomial time algorithm for finding the market
equilibrium. It runs in O(n4 log n) time.
Arrow–Debreu’s model [4] considers a more general model
in which each buyer, i, starts with an initial endowment
{ei1, ei2, . . . , ei|G|} of goods, where eij is the initial proportion
of goods j possessed by buyer i. If P is a vector of prices
for the goods, then the value of the goods for buyer i is
ei(P) = j∈G eijpj. Jain [5] gave a polynomial time algorithm
for computing an equilibrium for this model using the ellipsoid
algorithm. Ye [6] developed a faster polynomial time algorithm
for computing market equilibrium using interior point algo-
rithms. The algorithm in [6] runs in O(n4L) time, where L is the
bit-length of the input data Uij (where Uij is the utility of buyer
i purchasing all of goods j). It still remains an open problem on
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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using combinatorial techniques (other than the ellipsoid algo-
rithm). However, the Arrow–Debreumarket equilibrium can be
approximated using combinatorial methods. Jain et al. [7] gave
the first Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS)
for Arrow–Debreu’s model with linear utilities. They gave a
combinatorial method to compute an ϵ-approximate solution,
which runs in O(1/ϵ) calls of the algorithm in [2]. Devanur and
Vazirani [8] improved the running time to O((n7/ϵ) log n/ϵ).
This running time avoids dependence on the size of the inte-
gers in the problem instance. Garg and Kapoor [9] relaxed the
definition of approximation by permitting purchases to violate
their optimality conditions by ϵ. Under this revised notion of
approximation, they developed an O((n3/ϵ) log n/ϵ) time algo-
rithm. More recently, Ghiyasvand and Orlin [10] developed an
approximation algorithm that runs inO(n3/ϵ) time, using a new
definition of approximation.
Consider the following Invariants:
Invariant-1. The cut (s,G ∪ B ∪ t) is a min-cut in N(P).
Invariant-2. The cut (s ∪ G ∪ B, t) is a min-cut in N(P).
Therefore, an equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. prices P iff the
both Invariant-1 and Invariant-2 are satisfied. Supposing that
Invariant-1 is satisfied, but Invariant-2 is not. Thus, there are
some buyers with surplus money w.r.t. the current prices, P .
For satisfying Invariant-2, we should increase the prices. In this
paper, we suppose the current prices P cannot be changed. This
case can occure when, by the politics of a market, the current
prices should be constant. We call a set of buyers with surplus
money as a violated set and are looking for the violated setswith
maximum surplusmoney. Knowing these buyers can be helpful
so that they are sent to anothermarket or are not entered to the
current market.
In this paper, we define a set of such buyers as a maximum
mean set. For finding a maximum mean set, we define a
flow in N(P) called a min–max surplus flow and show the
relationship between a min–max surplus flow and a maximum
mean set, which says a maximum mean set can be computed
using a min–max surplus flow. We first prove a min–max
surplus flow canbe computedusing, atmost, |G|maximum flow
computations, then we show, using parametric networks, that
it is computed in O(mn log(n2/m)) time, where n = |B| + |G|,
and m is the number of pairs (i, j), such that buyer i has some
utility for purchasing goods j.
This paper consists of two sections in addition to the
introduction. Section 2 defines violated sets and maximum
mean sets. A method to compute a maximum mean set is
presented in Section 3.
2. Violated sets
In this section, we first present a necessary and sufficient
condition to satisfy Invariant-2 and define a new problem us-
ing this condition. For each T ⊆ B, define its money m(T ) =
j∈T ej. W.r.t. prices P , for S ⊆ G, define m(S) =

i∈S pi. For
T ⊆ B and S ⊆ G, define its neighborhood in N(P) by:
Γ −1(T ) = {i ∈ G| ∃j ∈ T s.t. (i, j) ∈ N(P)},
Γ (S) = {j ∈ B| ∃i ∈ S s.t. (i, j) ∈ N(P)}.
Each edge from G to B has a capacity of infinity, so, for each T ⊆
B,m(Γ −1(T )) is the maximum value of flow entering into T .Figure 1: The minimum cut (s ∪ G1 ∪ B1, t ∪ G2 ∪ B2).
Lemma 1. For given prices P, (s ∪ G ∪ B, t) is a minimum cut in
the network N(P) iff:
∀T ⊆ B : m(Γ −1(T )) ≥ m(T ).
Proof. It is obvious that if (s∪G∪ B, t) is a minimum cut, then,
for each T ⊆ B, the maximum flow entering into T should be
equal or bigger thanm(T ), i.e.m(Γ −1(T )) ≥ m(T ).
Now, supposing that∀T ⊆ B : m(Γ −1(T )) ≥ m(T ), we show
(s∪G∪B, t) is a minimum cut in N(P). Assume (s∪G1∪B1, t ∪
G2 ∪ B2) is a min-cut in N(P), with G1,G2 ⊆ A and B1, B2 ⊆ B.
Because each edge from G to B has a capacity of infinity and
the value of each maximum flow from s to t is not infinity, we
get Γ −1(B2) = G2 (see Figure 1). Thus, the capacity of the cut
(s∪G1∪B1, t∪G2∪B2) ism(G2)+m(B1). It is obvious that the ca-
pacity of the cut (s∪G∪B, t) ism(B1)+m(B2). On the other hand,
by assumption, we havem(B2) ≤ m(Γ −1(B2)) = m(G2), which
means m(B1)+ m(B2) ≤ m(G2)+ m(B1). Hence, (s ∪ G ∪ B, t)
is a minimum cut. 
For given prices P and each set T ⊆ B, we define the value of
set T by:
V P(T ) = m(T )−m(Γ −1(T )).
If Invariant-1 is satisfied, then, by Lemma 1, an equilibrium is
obtained w.r.t. prices P , iff, for every set, T ⊆ B : V P(T ) ≤ 0.
We define a set T ∈ B as a violated set if V P(T ) > 0. If Invariant-
1 is satisfied but an equilibrium is not obtained w.r.t. prices P ,
then Lemma 1 says that there are some violated sets in N(P)
w.r.t. the current prices P . We call the mean value of set T by:
V
P
(T ) = V
P(T )
|T | =
m(T )−m(Γ −1(T ))
|T | ,












We define V (P) = V P(T ∗) as the value of a maximum mean set
w.r.t. prices P . Using these definitions and Lemma 1, we get the
following conclusion.
Conclusion 1. If the Invariant-1 is satisfied, an equilibrium is
obtained w.r.t. prices P iff:
(a) For every set T ⊆ B: V P(T ) ≤ 0, or
(b) For every set T ⊆ B: V P(T ) ≤ 0.
Computing a maximum mean set helps to know the set of
buyers with maximum surplus money w.r.t. the current prices,
P . This information is helpful when there is anothermarket, but
a set of buyers with maximum surplus money should be sent
there.
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In this section, we first present a relationship between the
value of a maximum mean set with a flow in N(P), which we
call a min–max surplus flow. Then, using this flow, a maximum
mean set is computed.
3.1. Min–max surplus flow
Prices P are given such that Invariant-1 is satisfied. Let x be
a maximum flow from s to t . For each i ∈ B, surplus of i → t is
defined by δ(P, x)it = ei − xit . Also, themaximum surplus of the
maximum flow x is defined by:
δmax(P, x) = max
i→t
δ(P, x)it .
We define the min–max surplus by:
δ(P) = min{δmax(P, x)|x is a maximum flow}.
We say δ-equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. prices P if, in N(P), there
is a maximum flow x from s to t such that:
ei − xit ≤ δ ∀i → t.
Note that δ(P) is the smallest δ, such that a δ-equilibrium is
obtained w.r.t. prices P . Let x be a maximum flow such that
δmax(P, x) = δ(P), we call it a min–max surplus flow, which is a
maximum flow whose maximum surplus is minimum. We also
call the network N(P) a δ-network if, for each i ∈ B, the capacity
of each arc i → t is replaced by ei− δ. Thus, a min–max surplus
flow is a maximum flow in a δ(P)-network.
3.2. The relationship between a min–max surplus flow and a
maximum mean set
In this section, we prove that, for given prices P , the
min–max surplus δ(P) is equal to the value of amaximummean
set.
Lemma 2. If a δ-equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. prices P and
Invariant-1 is satisfied, then, for any set T ⊆ B, V P(T ) ≤ δ. In
particular, δ(P) ≥ V (P).
Proof. Let x be a maximum flow in a δ-network. For each set
T ⊆ B, we have:
m(T )−m(Γ −1(T )) =

i∈T
ei −m(Γ −1(T )).
By the definition of Γ −1(T ), we get m(Γ −1(T )) ≥ i∈T xit .
Hence:







x is a maximum flow in δ-optimal, which means:
m(T )−m(Γ −1(T )) ≤

i∈T
(ei − xit) ≤

i∈T




(T ) = m(T )−m(Γ
−1(T ))
|T | ≤ δ.
Let x′ be an orbitally maximum flow in N(P). Thus, we have:







δmax(P, x′) = |T |δmax(P, x′).Hence:
V
P
(T ) ≤ δmax(P, x′).
Because x′ is an orbitally maximum flow, we conclude V P(T ) ≤
δ(P). This result is true for each T ⊆ B, so V (P) ≤ δ(P). 
Theorem 3. For any price P, δ(P) = max{0, V (P)}.
Proof. Let δ = max{0, V (P)}. For each set T ⊆ B, the value of
set T in δ-network is:
V Pδ (T ) =

i∈T
(ei − δ)−m(Γ −1(T )),
so:
V Pδ (T ) = m(T )−m(Γ −1(T ))− |T |δ. (1)
In case δ = V (P), we have δ = V (P) = maxT⊆B V P(T ) ≥
m(T )−m(Γ−1(T ))
|T | , for each T ⊆ B. Hence, by Eq. (1), for each T ⊆ B,
we have:
V Pδ (T ) ≤ m(T )−m(Γ −1(T ))− |T |
m(T )−m(Γ −1(T ))
|T | = 0.
Thus, by Lemma 1, an equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. prices P in
the δ-network. We know δ(P), is the smallest δ such that P is
δ-optimal, so, we get:
δ(P) ≤ δ = V (P). (2)
By Lemma 2, we have δ(P) ≥ V (P), consequently, Eq. (2) yields
δ(P) = V (P).
In case δ = 0, we have V (P) ≤ 0. Hence, Conclusion 1 says
an equilibrium is obtained w.r.t. prices P and δ(P) = 0. 
3.3. Computing a min–max surplus flow
In this section, two methods to compute a min–max surplus
flow are discussed.
3.3.1. Computing a min–max surplus flow using O(|G|)maximum
flow computations
Prices P are given, we show how a min–max surplus flow is
computed. For it, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let f and f ′ be two maximum flows in N(P). If f is not
amin–max surplus flow in N(P) and f ′ is amin–max surplus flow
in N(P), then, for each node i ∈ B such that δ(P, f )it = δmax(P, f ),
we have δ(P, f ′)it < δ(P, f )it .
Proof. Consider a node i ∈ B, such that δ(P, f )it = δmax(P, f ).
We have:
δ(P, f ′)it ≤ δmax(P, f ′) < δmax(P, f ) = δ(P, f )it . 
For given prices P and a flow f in N(P), let R(P, f ) be the
residual network of N(P), with respect to flow f .
Lemma 5 ([2]). Let f and f ′ be two maximum flows in N(P). If
δ(P, f ′)it < δ(P, f )it for some i ∈ B, then, there exists a node,
j ∈ B, such that δ(P, f )jt < δ(P, f ′)jt and:
1. There is a path from node j to node i in R(P, f ) \ {s, t}.
2. There is a path from node i to node j in R(P, f ′) \ {s, t}. 
Property 1. If δ(P, f )jt < δmax(P, f ) and δ(P, f )it = δmax(P, f ),
then, there is no path from j to i in R(P, f ) \ {s, t}.
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f is amin–max surplus flow.
Proof. Suppose that for the sake of contradiction, f is not a
min–max surplus flow. Suppose that i is a node, such that
δ(P, f )it = δmax(P, f ) and consider a min–max surplus flow f ′.
By Lemma 4, we have δ(P, f ′)it < δ(P, f )it . Hence, by Lemma 5,
there exists a j ∈ B, such that:
δ(P, f )jt < δ(P, f ′)jt , (3)
and there is a path from j to i in R(P, f ) \ {s, t}. Thus,
δ(P, f )it = δ(P, f )jt , since δ(P, f )it = δmax(P, f ) and f satisfies
in Property 1. Therefore, we get δ(P, f )jt = δmax(P, f ), but by
Lemma 4, we have δ(P, f ′)jt < δ(P, f )jt , contradicting what
Relation (3) says. 
The following property is a generation of Property 1.
Property 2. δ(P, f )jt < δ(P, f )it , then, there is no path from j to i
in R(P, f ) \ {s, t}.
Devanur et al. [2] proved that amaximum flow, f , is balanced
if, and only if, it satisfies in Property 2. It is obvious if amaximum
flow f satisfied Property 2, then it satisfied Property 1. Thus, if
we find amaximum flow f which is balanced, then, by Lemma6,
f is a min–max surplus flow. Devanur et al. [2] computed the
balanced flow using, at most, |G|maximum flow computations,
so, a min–max surplus flow can be computed using, at most, |G|
maximum flow computations.
3.3.2. An O(mn log(n2/m)) time method to compute a min–max
surplus flow
In this section, we use the methods in Gallo et al. [11] to
compute δ(P) in O(mn log(n2/m)) time. By the definition of
δ(P), it is the smallest value of δ, such that there is a flow
saturating s in the δ-network. Thus, δ(P) is computed by solving
this parametric problem. Such a parametric problem is solved
in O(mn log(n2/m)) time using the methods in Gallo et al. [11].
Each maximum flow in the δ(P)-network is a min–max surplus
flow in N(P).
3.4. Finding a maximum mean set
In this section, we show that a maximum mean set is found
using a min–max surplus flow.
Lemma 7. Prices P are given, let T ∗ ⊆ B and x be a maximum
mean set and amin–max surplus flow, respectively, then:
δ(P, x)it = δ(P), ∀i ∈ T ∗.
Proof. x is a min–max surplus flow, so, we have:
δmax(P, x) = δ(P). (4)
W.r.t. the flow x, we have:
V P(T ∗) ≤

i∈T∗
(ei − xit) ≤ δmax(P, x)|T ∗|. (5)
T ∗ is a maximum mean set, so, by Theorem 3, we get V (P) =
V P (T∗)
|T∗| = δ(P), or:
V P(T ∗) = δ(P)|T ∗|.Hence, by Relations (4) and (5), we get:




≤ δmax(P, x)|T ∗| = δ(P)|T ∗|,
which says δ(P) = (ei − xit) = δ(P, x)it , for all i ∈ T ∗. 
For each min–max surplus flow, x, we have δ(P) = δmax,
so, Lemma 7 says each maximum mean set is a subset of the
set {i ∈ B|δ(P, x)it = δmax(P, x)}. Algorithm 1 computes a
maximummean set.
Lemma 8. At the end of Algorithm 1, we have W ≠ φ.
Proof. Supposing that, for the sake of contradiction,W = φ, so,
for each node i ∈ W , there is at least one (j, r) ∈ (Γ −1{i}, B −
W ) such that xjr ≠ 0. Thus, the algorithm sends some flow from
node r to node i in path r − j − i. Call the resulting flow x′.
Thus, for each i ∈ B, we get δ(P, x′)it < δmax(P, x), whichmeans
δmax(P, x′) < δmax(P, x), contradicting x is a min–max surplus
flow. 
Theorem 9. At the end of Algorithm 1, W is amaximummean set.
Proof. Invariant-1 is satisfied, so, for each arc, s → j, such that
j ∈ Γ −1(W ), we have xsj = pj. Thus:




At the end of the algorithm, for each arc j → i ∈ (Γ −1(W ), (B−






Hence, by Eq. (6), we get m(Γ −1(W )) = i∈W xit .
Consequently, we have:











By the definition of W , we have ei − xit = δmax(P, x) = δ(P),
so m(W ) − m(Γ −1(W )) = δ(P)|W | or V P(W ) = δ(P), which
means,W is a maximummean set. 
By Section 3.3.2, a min–max surplus flow can be computed
in O(mn log(n2/m)) time. Therefore, Algorithm 1 runs in
O(mn log(n2/m)) time to compute a maximummean set.
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